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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature Of The Case 
 
 Teresa Lee Tollman appeals from the denial of her motion for limited 
driving privileges. 
 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
 
 Tollman pled guilty to felony DUI and was sentenced to 10 years with two 
and one-half years determinate.  (#40907 R., pp. 35-36.)  The sentence also 
included a five-year post-release absolute driver’s license suspension. (#40907 
R., pp. 36-37.)  The court entered judgment on March 4, 2013.  (#40907 R., 
p. 35.) 
 Upon being paroled, Tollman moved for restricted driving privileges. 
(R., pp. 10-15.)  The district court denied the motion, at least in part on the basis 
that it lacked the authority to amend the sentence, specifically interpreting the 
2015 amendment to I.C. § 18-8005(6)(d) to not have retroactive effect. 
(R., pp. 16-18, 36; Tr., p. 7, L. 17 – p. 8, L. 3.1)  Tollman filed a notice of appeal 
within 42 days of entry of the November 7, 2016, order.  (R., p. 40.) 
   
                                            
1 The district court’s November 7, 2016, written order says the motion is being 
denied “for the same reasons” stated in the March 21, 2016, order.  (R., p. 36.)  
However, the prior order denied the motion on the basis of failing to show that 
Tollman qualified under the statute, either as it existed at the time of judgment or 
after the 2015 amendment, and did not address the issue of retroactive 
application of the 2015 amendment.  (R., pp. 16-18.)  The state therefore does 






 Tollman states the issue on appeal as: 
Whether the district court had discretion to grant Ms. Tollman’s 
application for a restricted driver’s license. 
 
(Appellant’s brief, p. 4.) 
 
 The state rephrases the issues as: 
 
 Has Tollman failed to show error in the district court’s conclusion it lacked 










Tollman Has Shown No Error In The District Court’s Conclusion It Lacked 




 The district court concluded it did not “have the power, even if [it] wanted 
to, to give back [Tollman’s] driver’s license.”  (Tr., p. 6, Ls. 6-13.2)  The district 
court reasoned this was because the suspension was “part of the actual criminal 
sentence.”  (Tr., p. 6, L. 19 – p. 7, L. 1.)  Thus, Tollman was “stuck with the 
driver’s license suspension that was imposed when [she] was sentenced.”  (Tr., 
p. 8, Ls. 14-20.)  This was “frustrating,” because the legislature changed the law 
so that “even when” the suspension is “part of the sentence” the judge can 
modify it, but that law did not apply and the court was “stuck with the law that was 
in effect in the first instance.”  (Tr., p. 7, L. 17 – p. 8, L. 3.) 
 On appeal, Tollman argues “the 2015 amendment to I.C. § 18-8005(6)(d) 
controls the analysis of Ms. Tollman’s application for a restricted driver’s license.”  
(Appellant’s brief, p. 6.)  Tollman’s claim that the 2015 amendment conferred 
jurisdiction upon the district court to amend her sentence is without merit. 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
 The interpretation and construction of a statute present questions of law 
over which the appellate court exercises free review.  State v. Thompson, 
140 Idaho 796, 798, 102 P.3d 1115, 1117 (2004); State v. Dorn, 140 Idaho 404, 
405, 94 P.3d 709, 710 (Ct. App. 2004).  Whether a court has subject matter 
                                            
2 The district judge did say that if she “had the discretion” to grant limited driving 




jurisdiction is a question of law, given free review.  State v. Kavajecz, 139 Idaho 
482, 483, 80 P.3d 1083, 1084 (2003). 
 
C. The District Court Properly Concluded It Lacked Jurisdiction To Amend 
The Driver’s License Suspension Entered As Part Of The Sentence For 
Felony DUI 
 
“Absent a statute or rule extending its jurisdiction, the trial court’s 
jurisdiction to amend or set aside a judgment expires once the judgment 
becomes final, either by expiration of the time for appeal or affirmance of the 
judgment on appeal.”  State v. Jakoski, 139 Idaho 352, 355, 79 P.3d 711, 714 
(2003).  Here the district court entered judgment on March 4, 2013.  (#40907 R., 
p. 35.)  Tollman does not contend that any statute in existence at that time gave 
the district court ongoing jurisdiction to later amend the driver’s license 
suspension portion of the sentence. 
Tollman argues that the district court’s jurisdiction to amend the driver’s 
license suspension imposed as part of the sentence in the 2013 judgment arises 
from a 2015 amendment to I.C. § 18-8005(6)(d), which empowered the district 
court to grant “restricted driving privileges” after the first year of a driver’s license 
suspension.  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 5-8.)  That statutory amendment was that a 
defendant convicted of felony DUI: 
Shall have his driving privileges suspended by the court for a 
mandatory minimum period of one (1) year after release from 
imprisonment, and may have his driving privileges suspended by 
the court for not to exceed five (5) years after release from 
imprisonment, during which time he shall have absolutely no driving 
privileges of any kind, and may have his driving privileges 
suspended by the court for an additional period not to exceed four 
(4) years, during which the defendant may request restricted driving 




preponderance of the evidence that driving privileges are 
necessary for his employment or for family health needs[.] 
 
2015 Idaho Sess. Laws, Ch. 60, p. 165 (text deleted by amendment shown in 
strikethrough, text added shown by underline).  Under its plain language (“shall 
have absolutely no driving privileges of any kind”) a sentence allowing restricted 
driving privileges would have been illegal in 2013, when judgment was entered.  
That such a sentence was made legal in 2015, at least in relation to the 
suspension after the first year, did not entitle Tollman to a reduction of her 
sentence. 
 An Idaho statute “is not applied retroactively unless there is clear 
legislative intent to that effect.”  Guzman v. Piercy, 155 Idaho 928, 937-38, 
318 P.3d 918, 927-28 (2014) (internal quotes omitted).  Likewise, “statutory 
amendments are not deemed to be retroactive unless there is an express 
legislative statement to the contrary.”  State v. Leary, 160 Idaho 349, 353, 
372 P.3d 404, 408 (2016).  “A statute is not made retroactive merely because it 
draws upon facts antecedent to its enactment” but is retroactive if it “changes the 
legal effect of previous transactions or events.”  Bryant v. City of Blackfoot, 
137 Idaho 307, 313, 48 P.3d 636, 642 (2002).   
 Nothing in the language of the amendment granted the district court 
authority to apply its provisions retroactively by reducing Tollman’s sentence.  
Indeed, Tollman does not argue otherwise.  Rather, she argues that the 
amendment was merely “remedial or procedural in nature” and that she is 




(citing Bryant, 137 Idaho at 313, 48 P.3d at 642).)  However, the very authority 
Tollman cites belies her argument.   
 A statute is applied retroactively if it “changes the legal effect of previous 
transactions or events.”  Bryant, 137 Idaho at 313, 48 P.3d at 642.  A statute is 
“procedural or remedial,” and therefore not applied retroactively, if it “does not 
create, enlarge, diminish or destroy contractual or vested rights.”  Id. at 313, 
48 P.3d at 642.  Under the statute as it existed at the time of Tollman’s 
sentencing, the defendant “shall have absolutely no driving privileges of any kind” 
for the entirety of the suspension.  After the amendment, the defendant is 
disallowed all driving privileges for the first year only, and restricted privileges 
may be granted for any remaining period of suspension.  This is an alteration of 
the scope of sentencing discretion available to the sentencing court, not a merely 
“procedural or remedial” change that “does not create, enlarge, diminish or 
destroy” rights.  If the legislature had intended to allow a reduction of the 
absolute driving suspensions previously imposed as terms of felony DUI 
sentences, it would have said so.  Absent such a statement, Tollman was not 
entitled to a reduction of her sentence in a manner that would have been illegal 
at the time it was imposed.  She was requesting a retroactive application of the 








 The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court’s 
denial of Tollman’s motion for restricted driving privileges. 
 DATED this 25th day of April, 2017. 
 
 
      _/s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen_______ 
      KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 








CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
 
 I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 25th day of April, 2017, served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by emailing an 
electronic copy to: 
 
 BRIAN R. DICKSON 
 DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
 




      _/s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen________ 
      KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
      Deputy Attorney General 
KKJ/dd 
